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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A group of university students quietly sat down in front of a government building 
in Hong Kong’s Admiralty district on September 26, 2014. A few weeks earlier, Hong 
Kong media outlets had announced that the dialogue between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong regarding electoral reforms had fallen through. The Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, China’s de facto legislature, ostensibly approved of Hong 
Kong’s bid for national elections with one major caveat: All candidates must be hand-
selected by the communist authorities in Beijing. “This is a fake democratic proposal,” 
remarked Hong Kong lawmaker Albert Chan, echoing the sentiments of thousands of 
disgruntled and disappointed Hong Kong residents.1  
The student sit-in at the Admiralty building was the culmination of a week-long 
boycott organized by student groups Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of 
Students. Scholarism’s teenage leader, Joshua Wong, explained in a call to action that: 
“Political reform is the core problem for every issue. Everyone knows that under the 
Chinese Communist party, there is a lack of possibility to fight [for] true universal 
suffrage in the end…but students should stand on the front line in every century.”2 Just 
                                                          
1 Tiffany Ap, “Can Hong Kong’s July 1 pro-democracy march energize political reform bid?” CNN, July 1, 
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/01/asia/hong-kong-july-democracy-march/ 
2 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Teenager Joshua Wong picks up democracy baton in Hong Kong,” Financial 
Times, September 22, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9d52261c-421e-11e4-9818-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3fDoGeZ4z 
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two days later, the students were joined by thousands of protestors as they marched 
through the streets of Hong Kong’s glittering, high-tech commercial district. Activists 
blocked key intersections, paralyzing traffic, as riot police launched canisters of tear gas 
into the peaceful crowd. In response to the noxious gas, activists raised umbrellas painted 
with pro-democracy messages, and thus the Umbrella Movement was born.3  
To some, this scene might appear reminiscent of images of demonstrators in 
Egypt and Iran in the preceding years, where young people took to the streets amidst a 
storm of tweets, texts, and blog posts. The Arab Spring movement of 2011 ignited an 
ongoing discussion about the role of communication technology in social movements, 
causing journalists and scholars alike to examine how platforms like mobile phone 
technology and the internet could be harnessed by activists in order to disseminate pro-
democratic messages and mobilize against authoritarian regimes. Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak was ousted in less than three weeks in a relatively bloodless revolution 
after millions of activists took to social media to express their discontent and organize 
mass protests. The 2009 election protest in Iran and the 2011 revolution in Tunisia were 
described as “Twitter revolutions,” a name referencing the primary instrument utilized by 
activists. When Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement burst onto the international stage in 
2014, one might have assumed that, like in Egypt and Tunisia in the years prior, the 
collective fervor of youthful activists would flood the streets and social media in equal 
measure and ultimately lead to another major victory for democracy. But that never 
happened, largely based on China’s skillful handling of the movement.   
                                                          
3 “Hong Kong protests: Timeline of the occupation,” BBC News, December 11, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30390820. 
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The Umbrella movement was in fact just the most recent of a series of protests 
stretching back to 2003 when pro-democracy activists first expressed their discontent 
with the encroaching authoritarian policies of Mainland China. These protests largely 
spark from the struggle between Hong Kong to exert a higher degree of democratic self-
rule and China’s policy of centralized control. Specifically, the issues of free elections 
and freedom of expression have generated a high degree of public contention.  
Although the frequency of Hong Kong’s protests could lead observers to believe 
otherwise, Hong Kong is not administered by a regime that encourages free political 
discourse or permits government criticism. Restrictive policies imposed by the People’s 
Republic of China are geared towards limiting the transmission of information deemed 
controversial, politically sensitive, or anti-government. Individuals found participating in 
subversive communications could realistically face arrest and imprisonment.4 On a larger 
scale, the government has openly engineered mass internet blackouts in regions of China 
embroiled in social unrest where demonstrations are believed to have been organized 
using technology like the internet and mobile phones. Despite such restrictions, Hong 
Kong has experienced a number of mass protests since 1997. This raises questions 
regarding how communication can be used as a tool to either advance or limit democratic 
progress in social movements like the Umbrella protest. Additionally, one may ask why 
recent social movements in Egypt and Tunisia succeeded while Hong Kong’s did not, 
despite activists having very similar digital tools at their disposal.   
                                                          
4 Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan, "Professionalism, Political Orientation, and Perceived Self-
Censorship: A Survey Study of Hong Kong Journalists" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Communication Association, TBA, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, May 21, 2008). 
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The relationship between communication technology and social movements is far 
from novel. Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in 1450 demonstrates 
how technological change can facilitate social change. His invention is credited with 
playing a key developmental role in the Renaissance, Reformation, and Scientific 
Revolution. More recently, Radio Free Europe was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 
1991 for its role in bringing down the Iron Curtain.5 Within the last decade, information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) have been lauded by some as a voice piece of 
the oppressed and tool for liberation, prompting prominent figures like Egyptian activist 
and Google Entrepreneur Wael Ghonim to espouse, “if you want to liberate a society, just 
give them the internet.”6 Yet despite the rallying power of digital communication, 
Freedom House reported in 2015 that more countries experienced declines in freedom 
than gains for the ninth consecutive year despite global surges in internet and mobile 
phone connectivity.7 Freedom House additionally reported a major increase in 
surveillance and overall decline in internet freedom, despite more people than ever being 
connected to the web.8  
                                                          
5 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 
2012), 20. 
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist Reason 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Cyrus Farivar, interviewed by Tony Cox, Internet: Road to 
Democracy…or Elsewhere? NPR, August 15, 2011.  
7“Freedom in the World 2015,” Freedom House, accessed February 14, 2016, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VsCv1_krLIU; “Mobile Phone 
Internet User Penetration Worldwide from 2012 to 2017,” Statista, accessed July 8, 2015, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/284202/mobile-phone-internet-user-penetration-worldwide/ 
8 Uri Friedman, “Will the World Grow More Authoritarian in 2014?” The Atlantic, January 6, 2014, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/01/will-the-world-grow-more-authoritarian-in-
2014/282840/ 
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As many authoritarian regimes around the world defy the inevitable collapse 
outlined in democratic transition theory,9 a growing body of research calls into question 
the liberating effects of ICTs and even demonstrates how ICTs can be effectively used 
against the populace. Cyber-communication has given rise to extensive and elaborate 
surveillance systems capable of tracking and recording details about internet users, 
essentially stripping away the protective shield of privacy. Skeptics are also concerned by 
the medium’s susceptibility to transmitting false information and giving rumors the 
veneer of fact.10 Contrary to popular assumptions, China in particular is actively 
promoting the usage of ICTs in order to facilitate economic growth, a policy which 
demonstrates China’s confidence in its own abilities to adapt to the challenges posed by 
digital communication.11 Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton succinctly 
tackled the duality of global communication technologies in a recent speech, stating that: 
Amid this unprecedented surge in connectivity, we must also recognize that these 
technologies are not an unmitigated blessing. These tools are also being exploited to 
undermine human progress and political rights. Just as steel can be used to build hospitals 
or machine guns, or nuclear power can either energize a city or destroy it, modern 
information networks and the technologies they support can be harnessed for good or for 
ill. The same networks that help organize movements for freedom also enable al-Qaida to 
spew hatred and incite violence against the innocent. And technologies with the potential 
to open up access to government and promote transparency can also be hijacked by 
governments to crush dissent and deny human rights.12   
Despite this seemingly clean division in technology’s perceived political 
alignment, the reality is much more nuanced. In truth, ICTs are simply tools without any 
inherent moral, political, or ethical substance, and are therefore impossible to generalize 
                                                          
9 Democratic transition theory explains the process through which non-democratic societies evolve towards 
democracy. (Sujian Guo, “Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview,” Issues & Studies 34 (1999): 133-
148.) 
10 Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, 17. 
11 Qinfeng Zhu and Marko M. Skoric, “The Role of ICT’s in Adaptive and Persistent Authoritarianism: A 
Study of China at the Administrative Division Level” (paper presented at 47th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Science, Waikoloa, Hawaii, January 6-9, 2014). 
12 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” (presentation, Washington D.C., January 21, 
2010). 
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from case to case. Simply because ICTs were integral to drastic political changes in 
Egypt does not mean all pro-democracy movements will experience the same level of 
success. In fact, in some cases, governments can expertly wield these digital tools to 
repress social movements and protect their own power.  
Broadly, this project seeks to understand why the Hong Kong protests failed to 
bring about meaningful democratic reforms despite the immense popular support of the 
movement. Even compared to earlier social movements in Hong Kong, which 
successfully pressured China to back down or negotiate on controversial policies, the 
Umbrella Movement was a failure.13 Yet, through the months of protests gripping Hong 
Kong, China barely lifted a finger in terms of employing coercive tactics like violence or 
physical intimidation, the traditional weapons in any authoritarian state’s arsenal. In the 
past, China has not shied away from being blatant with its tactics. When unrest erupted in 
China’s Xinjiang province in 2009, the government shut down the entire internet for ten 
months until protests subsided.14 The abortive “Jasmine Revolution” of 2011, directly 
inspired by Tunisia’s own revolution, was met with brutality as activists were beaten, 
arrested, and disappeared by Chinese authorities.15 Other than tear gas and a police 
perimeter, which is not uncommon even in democratic societies, nothing blatantly 
repressive took place in Hong Kong, yet the movement was shut down just the same amid 
                                                          
13 “Huge Protest Fills HK Streets,” CNN.com, last modified July 2, 2003. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/; “Hong Kong backs down over 
Chinese patriotism classes.” BBC News, September 8, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
19529867 
14 Chris Hogg, “China restores Xinjiang internet,” BBC News, May14, 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8682145.stm. 
15 Damian Grammaticas, “Calls for protests in China met with brutality,” BBC News, February 28, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12593328 
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reports of coercion, surveillance, and mass censorship. The PRC approached the Hong 
Kong protests with a level of subtlety and sleight of hand that seems out of character 
compared to their handling of Mainland protests. This disparity raises the question of 
why the PRC approached the Umbrella Movement so differently while still ensuring that 
activists did not meet their goal of democratic reform.   
In order to understand the reasons for the Umbrella movement’s failure, we must 
consider how specifically the government addressed the protests and the motivation 
behind its actions. This paper ultimately aims to answer the question: Why did the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) use ICTs to limit activists’ freedom of speech and 
collective action during the Umbrella Movement? While the PRC’s ultimate motivation 
of upholding the balance of power is clear, it is unknown why China did not crack down 
on Hong Kong’s activists with the same blunt, repressive force it has historically used 
against Mainland social movements. 
While the role of ICTs in the hands of activists is well researched, less attention 
has been focused on how governments utilize the same technology to defuse collective 
action in order to maintain their grip on power. In the case of China, prior research on the 
government’s methods of social control have largely focused on Mainland groups and 
activists.16 China’s response to the Umbrella Movement is novel for two reasons. First, 
China largely shied away from using physical repression. Second, the PRC sought to 
apply authoritarian tactics of social control to Hong Kong, a territory which enjoys legal 
freedom of expression and a traditionally laissez-faire approach to the exchange of ideas 
and opinions. Hong Kong’s unique relationship with China creates an opening for 
                                                          
16 Francis Lee, “Power and Strength of Networked Media and Connective Action: The Case of Hong 
Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” Communication Research and Practice, 6 (2016): 11-44. 
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insightful new research. This project aims to explore and understand the technology-
based methods of social control the PRC employed to both lessen the impact of and limit 
the momentum of the Hong Kong protest. Additionally, this project will seek to shed 
light on why the PRC opted to adopt ICTs for subtle methods of social control rather than 
relying on physical force to assert its power. Overall, the research will provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the methods of social control employed by modern 
authoritarian states. 
While any conclusions drawn in this paper will not be generalizable in the sense 
that they can be applied to cases outside the Umbrella movement, they will nevertheless 
contribute to a less-explored aspect of the relationship of technology and social 
movements, and will shed light on the PRC’s evolving approach to internal unrest. At its 
core, this project will provide an in-depth case study analysis of the Umbrella Movement, 
focusing on the specific reasons the PRC utilized ICTs to maintain their grip on power in 
the face of a rising tide of dissent. The events of the protest will be analyzed through the 
lens of authoritarian consolidation theory and collective action theory, which will provide 
a framework for understanding the resilience and surprisingly adaptive nature of 
authoritarian regimes despite external pressures to reform. An additional factor to 
consider, while not a primary focus of the study, is how specifically activists reacted to 
PRC censorship and surveillance actions.  
This paper is divided into seven chapters which will provide perspective and 
commentary on the ongoing scholarly debate regarding ICTs and government control, 
and will also provide a detailed examination of Hong Kong’s Umbrella protest utilizing 
recognized theories of authoritarian consolidation and collective action. Specifically, the 
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discussion will examine why the PRC used ICTs for the purposes of subtle methods of 
social control, such as censorship and surveillance of pro-democracy activists. Chapter 
two will conduct a detailed review of related literature, compiling prior investigations 
related to technology, social movements, and authoritarian control and synthesizing the 
material into a framework for this study. Chapter three provides an overview of several 
key theories and how they can be applied to understanding the role technology plays in 
authoritarian control. Chapter four outlines the methodological approach this project is 
adopting, and implements the method in a case study analysis of a major pro-democratic 
protests that took place in Hong Kong in 2014. The fifth and sixth chapters will provide 
historical context for the event followed by a case study analysis of discussion of the 
study’s results. Lastly, chapter six is the project’s denouement and will focus on 
concluding remarks and lessons learned from the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
With over six hundred million internet users, China is the most networked country 
on the planet, yet has some of the tightest controls on information and digital discourse.17 
A recent study observed that internet usage is ubiquitous among college students in 
Beijing, yet most students could not identify the iconic image of a man facing down a 
tank during the 1989 protests at Tiananmen Square.18 Nearly all references to the last 
major protest to have occurred in Mainland China have been removed from the web.19 
Gaps in information such as this one raise an entire host of questions regarding the ability 
of ICTs to foster meaningful, deliberative discourses between individuals in politically 
closed environments. This research question was designed to investigate why Hong 
Kong’s Umbrella Movement failed to achieve its objectives, despite the successful pro-
democratic movements that took place in Tunisia and Egypt with the aid of ICTs and 
social media.  
Since the Umbrella Movement’s failure hinges on the PRC’s ability to manage 
and contain the movement, this project will focus on the government’s counter-measures 
and underlying motivations. This project is unique in that seeks to shed light on why the 
PRC chose to adopt ICTs for subtle methods of social control rather than relying on 
                                                          
17 The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Continually 
updated. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
18 Ibid.   
19 Rebecca MacKinnon,“China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’” Journal of Democracy 22 (2011): 33.  
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physical force to assert its power as it has historically controlled protests on the 
Mainland. Recent mass protests in Mainland China, such as the 2009 outbreak in  
Xinjiang and the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, were blatantly repressed through a 
combination of violence, arrests, and an extended internet blackout in the case of 
Xinjiang.20 The following case study will examine exactly why the PRC’s tactics differed 
so drastically in Hong Kong.  
China is a major topic of interest for scholars from a variety of disciplines, and a 
plethora of research exists investigating the intersection between social movements and 
the communist regime’s elaborate system of social control. Despite the preponderance of 
scholarship on this particular question, the vast majority of the research concerns 
Mainland China with less attention focused on China’s Special Administrative Regions 
(SARs) such as Hong Kong.  
As a SAR, Hong Kong has a unique relationship with China that is not politically 
equivalent to that of a Mainland province. Hong Kong is technically ruled by Beijing, but 
the rules of their relationship are determined by the treaties and constitution co-written by 
the United Kingdom and China upon Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997.  As a result, 
Hong Kong’s administrative and legal structure differ in key ways from China’s 
Mainland provinces’. One major difference is that Hong Kongers are legally guaranteed 
the right to free speech.21 In the context of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, this raises 
the question of why Beijing interfered at all. Hong Kong’s unique and markedly un-
                                                          
20 Chris Hogg, “China restores Xinjiang internet,” BBC News, May14, 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8682145.stm.; Damian Grammaticas, “Calls for protests in China met with 
brutality,” BBC News, February 28, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12593328 
21 “Chapter III: Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents,” Last modified July 13, 2012, 
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_3.html. 
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Mainland political and legal climate also call into question whether the conclusions of 
studies of Mainland social movements can be applied to the Umbrella Movement. With 
its constitutional liberties and historically laissez-faire media, Hong Kong is unfamiliar 
territory to a communist regime used to having absolute control over the information and 
ideas shared between its citizens.  
Generally speaking, the relationship between technology and political repression 
has been well-researched, especially as it pertains to Mainland China. Previous literature 
is quite diverse in terms of theoretical framework and research design, providing an 
interesting constellation of perspectives. Results of prior scholarship fall on a wide 
spectrum in terms of whether or not technology plays a role in aiding or abetting political 
consolidation in autocratic countries, a factor this project will seek to clarify for the case 
of Hong Kong. Ultimately, prior literature will be used to frame this project’s 
understanding of why the PRC utilized ICTs to limit digital political dialogue and 
collective action during the Umbrella Movement despite Hong Kong’s legal guarantee of 
freedom of speech.  
The following chapter is divided into two major categories based on large 
divisions in prior research. The first and largest section will analyze research focused on 
the relationship between ICTs and authoritarian governance. For the purpose of providing 
a detailed review, the first section will be divided into several sub-sections, each 
investigating a different scholarly perspective on the relationship between government 
control and ICTs. A second, smaller section will provide a general overview of ICTs and 
democratization. This section will furnish additional context for the research question at 
hand.  
 13 
 
 
ICTs and autocracy  
 Following the Arab Spring movement, the internet and social media platforms 
were lauded as virtual panaceas against repressive dictatorships. In the midst of Iran’s 
Green Revolution, the New York Times described the “quintessential twenty-first century 
conflict” as armed riot police versus mobile phone toting youth.22 Indeed, this perspective 
of ICTs as “liberation technologies” is also rooted in journalistic and scholarly literature. 
Prominent social movement scholars like Larry Diamond have acknowledged the 
democratizing potential of digital communication.23 Despite the triumphs of social media 
against tyranny in success stories like Egypt, there are still a number of global autocracies 
that seem impermeable to the transformative potential of digital communication 
networks. This apparent discrepancy raises questions about the effectiveness of ICTs as 
conduits of political change, and invites further analysis of how authoritarian 
governments are harnessing communication technology to solidify their own grip on 
power.  
 
Empowering the government 
A significant number of scholars are highly critical of cyber-utopianism—the 
notion that ICTs are inherently emancipatory—and are quick to explain that 
communication technology is not limited to the hands of activists and can just as easily 
be utilized by self-interested elites looking to preserve the status quo. Research in this 
camp probes into how authoritarian regimes utilize ICTs behind the curtain to maintain 
                                                          
22 Nicholas Kristoff, “Tear Down This Cyberwall!” The New York Times, June 17, 2009. 
23 Larry Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” Journal of Democracy, 21 (2010): 69-83.  
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social control, and questions the potential of digital communication networks as conduits 
for political change. This line of research advocates for a more realistic understanding of 
ICTs, in which the weaknesses, drawbacks, and consequences of digital communication 
are addressed. 
One notable study directly questions the impact that digital communication 
technology has on social movements. Researchers hypothesized that ICTs are an effective 
conduit for the flow of information, but not for social organizing. They explain that user-
generated posts are most effectively used to criticize government policies, expose 
corruption, and call into question the system of governance by serving as a virtual 
alternative press, but not to mobilize mass movements. 24 This can be true even in 
societies where the government has a strong hold on the media.  Backing the argument 
with content analysis and contemporary examples, researchers demonstrate that recent 
mass social movements, such as the Iranian Green Movement, experienced a measure of 
success by using ICTs to disseminate images and videos which drew attention to a 
particular grievance. However, any attempts at actually orchestrating protests were 
quickly quashed by the government, therefore preventing activists from achieving any of 
their collective objectives. The authors also point out that freedom of information does 
not necessarily correlate with freedom of association, a distinction apparent in 
authoritarian states with relatively unrestricted digital spheres.  
Research on the role of the internet and democratization in post-Soviet states 
concluded that even in authoritarian countries with relatively unrestricted internet access, 
                                                          
24 Bruce Etling, Robert Faris, and John Palfrey, “Political Change in the Digital Age: The Fragility and 
Promise of Online Organizing,” SAIS Review, 30 (2010): 40-41.  
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pro-democracy movements are not guaranteed to take place.25 A notable case study 
reveals that ICTs alone are often not powerful enough to depose a highly coercive 
regime, or overcome deeply entrenched institutional and structural barriers.26 
Additionally, the author highlights the importance of a powerful opposition movement, 
since ICTs alone are unable to bring political inertia to a weak or fractured opposition.27 
In sum, this line of research is dubious of the assumption that ICTs have a strong stand-
alone impact on social movements or can effect political change. In other words, ICTs are 
capable of effecting change only under the right social and instructional circumstances.  
While the argument is certainly compelling, it is uncertain if lessons learned from the 
post-Soviet study can be applied to China, which differs from Soviet-style top-down 
authoritarianism in its heavier emphasis on citizen buy-in. In sum, the societies may 
simply be too different for lessons learned from one to apply to both.   
Another vein of research does not question the impact potential of ICTs on 
furthering social movements, but does caution that digital communication technologies 
can easily be used to strengthen and consolidate authoritarian regimes. This cautious 
perspective is largely based on the observation that ICTs are not exclusive to social 
activists, and that by treating ICTs as purely emancipatory, researchers have lost sight of 
how authoritarian governments have masterfully adapted technology for the purposes of 
surveillance, censorship and propaganda.28 Overall, the literature in this camp agrees that 
censorship and propaganda are particularly relevant to the case of China, where the 
                                                          
25 Rachel Vanderhill, “Limits on the Democratizing Influence of the Internet: Lessons from Post-Soviet 
States,” Demokratizatsiya 23 (2015): 55-56.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, xiv.  
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Golden Shield project, or Great Firewall as it is colloquially referred to in the West, 
forms a complex system of restrictions on the websites, content, and information that can 
be viewed by Chinese internet users. Authoritarian regimes rest on the control of 
information, and in today’s digital, information-based societies, controlling the internet 
means controlling the flow of information.  
Scholars have investigated the full-range of the authoritarian censorship arsenal, 
including website-blocking, deletion of politically objectionable material, and 
surveillance. The Arab Spring movement has allowed scholars a glimpse at how 
authoritarian regimes are simultaneously grappling with the challenges posed by ICTs 
and learning how to harness them to consolidate and defend their power. A case study of 
the 2009 election protests in Iran revealed the inherent duality of ICTs: While activists 
were flocking to social media to disseminate information and coordinate collective 
action, the government reacted in real-time by deploying a far-reaching censorship 
network, repressing online protests, and using propaganda, rumors, and false information 
to fuel confusion.29  
In addition to understanding specifically how authoritarian governments use ICTs 
to protect their own rule, of equal importance is understanding why. In a recent study 
about censorship and self-expression in China, researchers analyze China’s far-reaching 
internet censorship initiative in order to reverse-engineer the PRC’s policy objectives, 
which are typically obscured by a shroud of secrecy. Researchers were somewhat 
surprised to discover that China did not censor all information critical of the regime, but 
only posts that showed a clear potential to snowball into collective action. A quantitative 
                                                          
29 Daniel Baldino and Jarrad Goold, “Iran and the Emergence of Information and Communications 
Technology: The Evolution of Revolution?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68 (2014): 19.  
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analysis of popular key words revealed that any posts capable of inciting social 
mobilization were deleted, even when the apparent call to action was apolitical in 
nature.30 Historians point out that the influence of age-old Confucian traditions in 
Chinese politics have created a pattern of legitimacy earned through collective action.31 
As a result, China’s political elites have a long history of stemming potential 
collectivization by clipping social ties between individuals.32 The ruling Chinese 
Communist Party is acutely aware of the impact social movements have on their overall 
legitimacy, and have even been known to carefully encourage protests that bolster their 
image or re-direct popular ire towards a rival target, such as the protests against Japan’s 
involvement in the Senkaku islands in 2012, while simultaneously quashing movements 
that question the CCP’s ability to rule effectively.33 In the twenty-first century, this 
dynamic has persisted as China adapts to new forms of communication technology. 
Additionally, China’s system of censorship reveals not only the government’s focus on 
stemming collective action of any kind, but the system’s level of sheer sophistication, 
complexity, and subtlety.  
The element of subtlety is something that modern authoritarian regimes strive for, 
since research on authoritarian strategies of social control conclude that blatant coercion 
damages regime legitimacy.34 In response, modern censorship methods have become 
more discrete and geared towards thought-steering than blatantly blocking or deleting 
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undesirable information. A researcher at University of Hong Kong’s China Media Project 
explains that China’s state-run press is becoming increasingly centered around telling 
China’s “side of the story,” in other words, crafting a single state-approved narrative or 
agenda.35 The goal of telling China’s story is the creation of a carefully engineered 
information gap, which quietly obscures any information that could spark widespread 
disapproval among the populace, all without internet users realizing it.36 
At this point, it is important to note that the sophistication of technologically-
rooted, authoritarian methods of social control have evolved in step with the progress of 
communication technology.  The complexity and effectiveness of authoritarian internet 
control paradigms can be broken into three generations. The first generation, spear-
headed by China, is characterized by a national-level filtering scheme.37 Second 
generation controls are much more difficult to detect, which provides the government a 
screen of plausible deniability, and also extends into the country’s legal and normative 
terrain to shape it in favor of the security structure.38 The most sophisticated level of 
control is the third generation, which is hallmarked not by the direct intervention of the 
first generation, but by subtler methods of social control, such as dialogue steering, 
propaganda, and misinformation campaigns geared towards discrediting dissenting 
voices.39  Presently, China is known to implement all three generations of technology in 
their program, resulting in a highly sophisticated and pervasive paradigm of censorship, 
surveillance, and dialogue-steering. Somewhat paradoxically, spikes in global internet 
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user rates have created new spheres for free speech, but have also created an opening for 
more extensive government control. The rise of “intermediary censorship,” in other 
words content-monitoring that the government outsources to private parties such as 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Online Service Providers (OSPs), broaden the 
government’s scope while allowing it to surpass its own limitations in terms of resources 
and personnel. These newer, decentralized methods require ICT-based corporations, such 
as ISPs, search engines, and blogging platforms, to be complicit with government 
restrictions on content and by relinquishing user data on demand. U.S.-based corporation 
Yahoo! came under scrutiny in 2005 after it yielded information about a Hong Kong 
journalist which eventually led to his arrest.40 The rise of intermediary censorship poses 
the greatest threat to activists in authoritarian states, who have to rely on secrecy and 
anonymity in order to avoid unwanted attention or punishment.  
 Overall, research in this vein demonstrates specific ways in which authoritarian 
governments are incentivized to control ICTs in order to protect their own position of 
power. Related scholarship indicates that prior social movement research often 
overlooked the capacity ICTs have to strengthen autocratic regimes, and stress the 
importance of further research in order to fully understand the relationship between ICTs 
and regime consolidation. A related camp of research, which explores the duality of 
ICTs, will be covered in the following sub-section.   
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A cautious take 
 A number of scholars acknowledge that in reality nothing as simple as “us versus 
them” exists, and instead adopt a cautious and more nuanced approach to ICTs and 
regime change. Research in this vein tends to acknowledge that ICTs have the potential 
to strengthen or threaten authoritarian regimes in equal measure, the results of which 
depend exclusively on how effectively forms of digital communication are managed by 
the regime.  
Recent research provides a detailed analysis of modern autocratic regimes’ 
highly-networked approach to authoritarian governance, and describes how online 
activism has the potential to either hurt or help the regime. Specifically, researchers have 
demonstrated how the Chinese regime has been particularly masterful about managing 
digital communication in its various forms. In fact, China has been so adept at integrating 
ICTs, that researcher Rebecca MacKinnon coined the phrase “networked 
authoritarianism” to capture the full depth of its intricate strategy of social control.41 
Networked authoritarianism describes how communication technology has fundamentally 
altered the dynamic between the government and the populace as compared to classic 
authoritarianism. ICTs allow individuals to express critical opinions and observations 
about the regime, essentially creating a space for public political dialogue, which results 
in a sense of freedom of expression and civic agency among digitally connected citizens. 
However, despite the perception of freedom, citizens under networked authoritarian states 
still lack formal channels of political participation, lack individual rights, and can face 
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repercussions like jail time if deemed a threat to the state. 42 Additionally, digital activism 
can inadvertently strengthen autocratic regimes through broad-sweeping calls to action, 
like the end of one-party governance or demands for free elections, which can cause 
factions within the regime to join forces against the perceived, collective threat. Another 
study echoes this concern, describing how external threats to the party often cause hard-
liners and soft-liners to band together.43 
The duality of ICTs can also be extended to social activists, illustrating how the 
digital tools used to collectivize in non-democratic societies can actually leave activists 
vulnerable. This is largely due to authoritarian regimes weaving their social control 
programs into the country’s institutional and legal fabric. As touched on previously, this 
process occurs in three “generations,” the first of which involves setting up a system of 
censorship, filtering, and digital surveillance, which poses the least overall risk to 
activists. However, the second and third generations include more invasive measures like 
warrantless investigations, deliberate internet black-outs, and collusion between the 
government and private companies regarding information control. Additionally, 
constructing a legal environment around information control strips away privacy 
protections and criminalizes certain behaviors associated with social activism. Overall, 
scholars acknowledge that ICTs possess a strong potential for inciting mass pro-
democracy movements, but ultimately conclude that obstacles such as institutional 
barriers, government policy, and corporate complicity can prevent that potential from 
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being realized. One study of note concludes that transparency, rule of law, and 
accountability must be improved in order for activists to be fully protected.44  
Another line of research developed a model that demonstrates how ICTs have the 
power to either strengthen or undermine authoritarian rule. The author of a notable study 
argues that even digitally-connected autocracies can resist democratization by using ICTs 
to systematically consolidate their own power. Certain types of digital technology 
promote government resilience by preventing social unrest, disseminating subtle and 
persuasive forms of propaganda, and by providing officials with a pulse on public 
opinion and social grievances.45 Related scholarship also posits that by approaching ICTs 
as a force to be harnessed for economic growth, the Chinese regime was also able to 
increase various facets of its power and therefore further entrench itself in governance. 
The Chinese model’s capacity for resilience is exceptionally noticeable when compared 
to regimes that take a more aggressive stance against ICT penetration, such as Myanmar, 
which suffers from the economic frailty that goes hand-in-hand with an underdeveloped 
digital infrastructure.  
Scholarship exploring the duality of ICTs recognize that technology has the 
capacity to either strengthen or challenge the grip of authoritarian regimes. Research in 
this camp largely relies on case study analyses in order to demonstrate how different 
regimes adapt (or fail to adapt) to the challenges posed by widespread internet and mobile 
phone usage. China is cited repeatedly for its ability to effectively evolve its methods of 
social control in order to keep up with the changing technological landscape. Research 
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also cites how ICTs can actually open up social activists to certain vulnerabilities, which 
in turn affects their ability to successfully mobilize against a regime. Since a huge 
component of regime resilience is the ability to mitigate external threats, such as mass 
social movements, the next section will delve into the relationship between ICTs and 
social activism.  
 
ICTs: Destabilizing autocracy  
 Part of the broader dialogue of regime change and collective action is the impact 
that ICTs have on social activism. This vein of research is integral to the research topic at 
hand because, as explained in the previous section, collective action can play a direct role 
in facilitating regime change, and a large body of scholarship indicates that ICTs 
strengthen social movements. This section will provide an overview of recent research on 
ICTs and democratization, with the goal of providing a big picture understanding of why 
authoritarian regimes are concerned with keeping a tight rein on communication 
technologies.  
Despite the preponderance of censorship mechanisms, some scholars remain 
optimistic that the ability to participate in digital, public discourses is enough to fuel 
collective energy and invoke meaningful political change. This school of thought stresses 
that the sense of agency and participation fostered by digital discourse cannot be 
mitigated by censorship.46 Prominent social movement scholar Larry Diamond 
encapsulates ICTs’ potential for democratization in the term “liberation technology.” The 
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term includes any form of ICT capable of increasing political, economic, and social 
liberties that “enables citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, 
mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and 
expand the horizons of freedom.”47 Diamond highlights newer forms of technology, like 
the internet and mobile phones, as being more conducive to mobilization than older, 
passive forms of technology like the radio and television. The active, participatory nature 
of newer generation ICTs create a decentralized environment ripe for grass roots action 
and the rapid sharing of information among countless users. While Diamond certainly 
takes a more optimistic stance for technology’s pro-democratic potential, he ultimately 
concludes that technology is simply a tool without any inherent political allegiance.  
  An under-examined aspect of ICT-enabled collective action is the impact of 
anonymity. A study of note on this topic explains that ICTs are characterized by isolation 
and anonymity, but somewhat paradoxically, can also facilitate solidarity and 
collectivization. The ability to act anonymously is obviously a significant advantage for 
individuals fearing backlash or repercussions for taking part in actions critical of the 
government.  
A critical debate at the center of this topic is whether or not the internet actually 
facilitates democratic action at all or merely provides the illusion of doing so.  A number 
of scholars argue that technology does in fact facilitate meaningful democratic action.48 
The impact of modernization and globalization, including the erosion of state borders, the 
emergence of transnational corporations, and citizen apathy towards official methods of 
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political participation like voting have cleared the way for alternative forms of 
engagement outside of the mainstream. Technology has also altered the landscape of 
political action by introducing brand new forms of participation.49 Additionally, the use 
of ICTs has shifted the focus of collective goals to favor single-issue, value driven goals 
rather than the ideologically-rooted, broad-sweeping social changes of the past. This 
body of research reveals a fascinating trend in how emerging forms of technology are 
actually re-shaping the landscape of social movements. 
Broadly, the literature has identified three major points at which technology and 
participation potentially intersect: participation costs, collective identity, and a sense of 
community.50 Participation costs are affected in that ICTs allow for cheaper, more 
efficient methods of communication between individuals within a group. Collective 
identity is the concept of group solidarity through shared grievances. This is related to the 
networking potential of the internet, which enhances the organizational structure of social 
movements by solidifying loosely structured networks and optimizing the flow of 
information.51 Lastly, a sense of community is derived from individuals connecting 
through shared interest, goals, or grievances. This sense of community ties into the idea 
that the internet has emerged as a new public sphere capable of sustaining democratic 
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dialogue.52 Research has also indicated, somewhat counter intuitively, that activities 
characterized by isolation and anonymity can actually enhance group attraction.53 
A major discussion amongst social movement researchers relates to how protest 
tactics are affected by the use of ICTs. Rapid mobilization, swarming behavior, and the 
ability to act on multiple fronts simultaneously are all benefits of technologically aided 
communication.  An additional benefit is that the near instantaneous dissemination of 
information creates transparency and increases the public accountability of elites.54 This 
phenomenon is known as the inverted panopticon, and is especially relevant to 
populations under authoritarian rule.55 
          Despite the obvious benefits, some researchers caution against an over-reliance on 
ICTs, stressing that technology is frequently wielded by authoritarian regimes in order to 
further repress the populace which therefore renders any advances in communication 
between private citizens moot. The integrity of information transmitted through ICTs has 
also been called into question by researchers.56 False or misconstrued information can be 
rapidly transmitted through communication networks and deleteriously impact the 
understanding of critical issues or events connected to social movements.57 The effect 
was apparent in the crack-down following the Iranian election protests during which 
Twitter became rife with rumors such as “police helicopters were pouring acid and 
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boiling water on protesters,” a claim that could never be substantiated.58 An opposing 
argument counters this notion by explaining that ICTs can just as easily be used to fact 
check information and dissipate misinformation as well as the sort of sensationalist 
apocrypha produced during the Iranian protests.59 Essentially, the Iranian example 
underlines the notion that ICTs are simply a tool capable of producing a wide range of 
results based on how they are utilized in a given situation.  
Another vein of research skeptical of the pro-democratizing power of ICTs states 
that access to the internet has no significant impact on citizen participation levels. A 
number of studies observed that political participation rates in the United States have not 
changed much since 1950 despite major technological advancements.60 The cause for this 
lack of change is rooted in the political-psychological phenomenon that increased 
exposure to low-cost information cannot enhance human beings’ ability to systematically 
absorb it. While this assertion has broad implications in terms of human understanding of 
information, his conclusions do not necessarily preclude an increase in accessing and 
acting on said information. 
The body of literature related to ICTs and social movement participation is 
expansive and diverse in perspectives. The majority of researchers in this group agree 
that ICTs have altered the landscape of political participation in some shape or form, with 
the exception of a study that questions the relationship between ICTs and political action. 
The methods of these studies also varied significantly and included both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Previous literature on the topic of social control and 
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communication technology is varied but can generally be divided into the broad themes 
of whether ICTs strengthen or weaken authoritarian regimes. Advocates of ICTs as tools 
of regime survival cite how technology strengthens government capabilities for 
censorship, surveillance, and propaganda. Those in favor of ICTs’ pro-democratizing 
nature explain that technology can undermine autocratic rule by allowing activists to 
communicate and organize in order to achieve collective goals, in addition to ICTs 
serving as an alternative press to share criticism of the regime.  
 In terms of theoretical framework, theories related to social movements and regime 
transition were most common in the literature. In prior studies, democratic transition 
theory and authoritarian consolidation theory were popularly used as lenses to clarify the 
role of ICTs under authoritarian regimes. Some researchers found that communication 
technologies carried an intrinsic liberalizing effect, while other studies concluded that 
ICTs could easily be co-opted by the government to stabilize its own rule. Social 
movement theories, such as collective action theory, were typically employed for projects 
focused on how successful social movements employed ICTs, but did not address failed 
movements in equal measure. The following chapter will draw upon the literature to 
establish a theoretical lens for this particular project.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
 
The theoretical groundwork of this project seeks to explain why the PRC utilized 
ICTs as a subtle method of social control to limit freedom of speech and collective action 
during the 2014 Umbrella Movement. In order to answer this question, a deeper 
understanding of the PRC’s underlying motivation is necessary. Based on related 
research, authoritarian consolidation theory and the theory of collective action potential 
were chosen as lenses to better understand different dimensions of the research question 
at hand.  
 
Authoritarian consolidation  
Authoritarian consolidation theory seeks to explain the nature of how and why 
certain authoritarian regimes persist while others collapse or transition toward 
democracy. Traditionally, theories regarding regime change and democratic transition 
hold that non-democratic regimes are gradually and inevitably gravitating towards 
democratization. This is largely due to the assumption that authoritarian governments are 
inherently frail based on fragile legitimacy and dependence on overtly coercive tactics of 
social control.61 A number of authoritarian states, including China, seem to have 
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weathered the “third wave”62 of democratic change and appear to be growing more stable 
and complex over time. The relatively nascent authoritarian consolidation theory is 
emerging from the growing number of scholars interested in how particular regimes have 
resisted pressure to democratize, despite an overwhelming body of research that asserted 
democratization was a nearly inevitable global phenomenon.  
A core assumption of democratic transition theory is that all autocratic states are 
gravitating towards the eventual end-goal of democracy. Recent research on the survival 
of authoritarian regimes has uncovered a blind spot in democratic theories, pointing out 
that prior theories focused on factors that precipitated change, neglecting to investigate 
causes that lend stability to autocratic regimes.63 This new vein of research tunes into 
regime strengths, which naturally increase the likelihood of regime stability, rather than 
searching exclusively for weaknesses which might signal eventual transition.  
Before further analyzing the root causes of consolidation, we must first answer this 
question: what is consolidation? Generally, consolidation is defined as a regime’s 
progression toward relative stability.64 Although democratic and authoritarian regimes 
differ in numerous ways, the process of consolidation is actually quite similar for both in 
that it occurs when a complex system of institutions and rules becomes uncontested.65 
Ultimately, consolidation theory provides a framework for understanding the factors that 
contribute to long-term regime stability. Key to regime stability and survival, for both 
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authoritarian and democratic governments alike, is the accomplishment of comprehensive 
authority, a status that describes a central government’s ability to effectively reign in 
various social and political forces.66 While coercion can technically be utilized to 
accomplish comprehensive authority, any newfound unity will be short-lived as coercive 
powers tend to rapidly erode regime legitimacy.67  
Factors influencing authoritarian consolidation are numerous, but can be grouped 
into four broad categories including: institutional, attitudinal, economic, and external 
factors.68 While all of these factors contribute to regime survival, the institutional aspect 
was found to be most relevant to social movements and their resulting threat to stability. 
Regime stability is integrally connected with institutional strength and pervasiveness, and 
a key factor in regime resilience is the government’s capacity to effectively embed itself 
in office, an endeavor which relies on a careful balance of power between elites, and the 
perception of legitimacy between elites and on the populace. 69 Although authoritarian 
regimes lack the electoral institutions of democracies, it is important to note that 
leadership change still does occur within autocratic regimes and is not the same as regime 
change, which indicates systemic upheaval. However, peace between elites is not the 
only ingredient to stability.  
Regime resilience also depends on the regime’s ability to manage conflicts 
between elites and the populace. In democracies, this is achieved through regular 
elections, universal suffrage, and written constitutions. In autocracies, different 
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institutions exist to address the demands of the people in order to foster a sense of 
legitimacy and long-term regime stability. These alternative institutions fulfill the double-
benefit of bolstering regime legitimacy in the eyes of the populace while allowing the 
regime to remain in complete formal control of policy decisions.70 Overall, these 
institutions are carefully designed with the intent of discouraging collective action. This 
allows the government to acknowledge a certain degree of criticism while making only 
minor policy adjustments.  Additionally, it provides officials a direct method of 
monitoring public opinion, which directly benefits the regime by providing insight into 
the public’s thoughts, concerns, and grievances.71 Even in authoritarian regimes, it is 
critical to have conflict resolution systems such as this bridging the interests of the people 
and the elites.72 This system can also work as a pressure valve for social unrest. By 
framing issues as easily solvable individual complaints, they are not likely to gain inertia 
and grow into mass discontent.  
Some scholars are skeptical of the integrity and effectiveness of these conflict 
resolution institutions73. Rather than representing genuine democratic channels, critics 
argue that these institutions instead fabricate a false veneer of dialogue between the 
populace and their leaders, in addition to providing the government a channel for keeping 
tabs on its citizens and transmitting propaganda.74 Studies show that complaints often go 
unaddressed or unresolved, and that the government is likely using the system as a clever 
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way of monitoring public opinion without any real intention of meaningfully addressing 
the conflict.75  
These institutions are significant because they allow the regime a high degree of 
social control that does not rely on overtly coercive tactics like violence and terror. 
Coercive power is key to resisting regime change, but if wielded improperly, can signal 
weakness or even backfire to galvanize opposition movements.76 This highlights the 
importance of carefully calibrated coercion, which aims to neutralize challenges with 
minimal political fallout.77  ICTs enable governments to employ subtler methods of 
coercion like censorship, surveillance, and digital crowd control, which are less harmful 
to its public image and legitimacy than violent means of control. Relevant scholarship 
further argues that consolidation involves the regime learning how to interact with 
various political and social groups in a non-despotic manner, therefore reducing the risky 
side-effects associated with blatant coercion.78 In terms of why only particular 
authoritarian regimes, like China and Russia, experience long-term survival while others 
do not, researchers posit that the quality of the regime itself, rather than regime type, 
determines regime longevity.79 This argument challenges the democratic transition 
theorists’ assumption that all authoritarian regimes are destined to collapse, and opens the 
door to examining how the qualities and characteristics of a particular regime determine 
longevity.  
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Collective action  
The relationship between mass social movements and regime change is well 
established, and supporting case studies abound from around the globe, including former 
Eastern Bloc states and, more recently, social movements in the Middle East. Successful 
authoritarian regimes understand that regime longevity depends on a careful balance of 
perceived legitimacy and social order.  
In social movement research, collective action theory is commonly cited by 
researchers seeking to determine the causes and facilitating factors of mass 
collectivization. This particular theory provides a basis for understanding why individuals 
seek to collectivize in order to achieve certain common goals. Foundational research on 
collective action theory states that individuals who share common or overlapping 
interests will collectivize in order to achieve common goals.80 Understanding how and 
why individuals aggregate around a specific cause will provide insight into how the PRC 
identifies, addresses, and ultimately defuses collectivization.  
The innovation of modern communication technology has introduced a new 
element into social movement dynamic. ICTs can enable group collectivization in 
societies that lack formal channels of participation, and in some cases can even overcome 
intentional communication barriers like government censorship programs. The potential 
for ICTs to enable collective action is an inherent paradox in that a medium characterized 
by social isolation can facilitate social unity.81 The progression of research on the subject 
has evolved over time, with early researchers arguing that the internet served to alienate 
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individuals through the reduction of social cues, while more recent academic 
investigation has revealed just the opposite.82 The depersonalizing effect of internet 
activities serves to minimize differences between individuals and enhance a sense of 
group sameness.83 Ultimately this phenomenon stems from the idea that social identity—
or the aspects of an individual's identity derived from group membership— remains 
potent even in the absence of physical proximity.84 Additionally, a formal sense of 
collective identity is not necessarily a requisite for collective action as long as “imagined 
solidarity” exists as a unifying force.85 The idea of collectivization despite anonymity and 
individual isolation is important, since authoritarian regimes have long relied on 
atomization and alienation as strategies to thwart collective action. As a result, autocratic 
strategies of social control have evolved to rely on more subtle forms of coercion and 
manipulation online.  
The intersection of mobilization and anonymity in relation to social movements is 
especially relevant to understanding collective behavior in authoritarian states. Some 
research stresses that activists are increasingly endangered by the content they publish 
online due to the erosion of privacy.86 This is true in the case of Hong Kong, where 
censorship policies and a fear of legal repercussions often prevent individuals from 
publicly broadcasting opinions that could be considered subversive or critical of 
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government actions.87 Essentially, communication technologies are eroding the ability of 
autocratic regimes to maintain a monopoly on information, which in the past was a 
classic authoritarian strategy for social control.   
Research by Manual Castell demonstrates that ICTs increase transparency of 
information which vastly minimizes “communication-free pockets,” resulting in group 
empowerment and mobilization. Enhanced communication leads to increased visibility of 
issues in the political sphere which directly stimulates participation in social movements. 
Through this argument he indicates that technology is capable of fundamentally 
modifying social structures.88 Castell’s research also makes an important distinction: 
ICTs are a potent medium for change but not a cause. Extending Castell’s argument to 
the research project at hand, ICTs will be treated as a non-causal medium while 
examining their role in a series of recent protests in Hong Kong.  
The PRC is well aware of how ICTs can enable unsanctioned channels of 
communication between individuals, and the potential damage that the resulting social 
movements can cause to the regime. In response to the threat of collective action, “the 
stated perspective of the Chinese government is that limitations on horizontal 
communications is a legitimate and effective action designed to protect its people.”89 In 
other words, the Chinese government views collective action as a direct threat to social 
and political stability and works to identify and defuse social movements before they can 
gain any serious momentum. The overlapping lenses of the theory of collective action 
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potential and authoritarian consolidation theory will shed light on how the PRC 
approaches ICTs in regards to regime stability.  
The theory of collective action potential originally appeared in a 2012 research 
article by Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. The article focuses on China’s 
intricate censorship paradigm and posits that the paradigm’s ultimate goal is not to 
simply block controversial messages, but to diffuse the larger threat of collective action. 
King’s research utilizes a slight reframing of collective action theory that specifically 
focuses on the causes of collective action in relation to the preventative measures the 
government may take to diffuse it. This is based on the Chinese government’s perspective 
that unsanctioned mass action of any sort threatens the order and safety of society. Since 
China experiences a high number of “mass incidents” each year, reporting over 180,000 
in 2010 alone,90 controlling collective action is a major concern of the communist 
regime.91 In fact, the PRC takes the issue so seriously that local officials are evaluated in-
part by the frequency of collective action in their localities.92  
The theories explored in this section will provide an investigative lens for two 
important aspects of this project. Authoritarian consolidation theory establishes a 
framework for understanding how and why the PRC may utilize ICTs to strengthen its 
power and mitigate external threats like social movements. Collection action theory 
provides an in-depth understanding of the nature of social movements and how ICTs can 
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be harnessed by activists to rapidly disseminate information and organize to achieve 
collective goals, both of which threaten the PRC. Now that a theoretical backing has been 
established, the next section will construct a research design for the specific question at 
hand.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
The methods selected for this project will shed light on the question: Why did the 
PRC utilize ICTs as a subtle means to limit freedom of speech and collective action 
during the Umbrella Movement? This section will discuss the broad structure underlying 
this project’s investigation, including the case study method, the illustrative analytic 
approach, the specific variables under scrutiny, and data-collection methods.  
A core assumption of this study is that the PRC is motivated by a drive to remain 
in power, and to not allow its political influence to erode to the point that substantive 
democratic reforms are made in Hong Kong. Based on a thorough investigation of the 
Chinese government’s extensive usage of internet censorship and surveillance, this study 
also assumes that the PRC is willing to manipulate ICTs in ways that align with its own 
goal of self-preservation. This study will focus on several key methods the PRC 
employed in order use ICTs to its own advantage, including censorship and surveillance. 
In terms of delimitations, the analysis will be limited to the mass protest known as the 
Umbrella Movement which occurred in Hong Kong during September and December 
2014.  
Since discerning how ICTs were utilized during the Umbrella Movement hinges 
on a full understanding of key contextual and historical conditions, the case study was 
selected as the most appropriate method for this particular research question. In an 
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instructional publication on case study research, Robert Yin explains that the method is 
ideal for research questions that focus on observable phenomenon grounded in a real-
world context.93 Additionally, case studies are ideal for tackling the “how” and “why” 
behind complex contemporary phenomena.  
Another strength of the case study lies in its ability to synthesize multiple sources 
of evidence into a multi-dimensional framework of analysis. This thesis will draw from a 
number of sources in order to establish a comprehensive picture of events and to ensure 
accuracy of evidence. Specifically, news articles, reported interviews with demonstrators, 
and blog entries from the time frame of the protest will be used to establish a framework 
for the events. Since ICTs allowed for activists to communicate and upload information 
in real-time, a plethora of first-hand information exists documenting the protests. 
Government usage of ICTs will be measured through data regarding censorship and 
surveillance. Specifically, censorship can be gauged by the frequency of deleted internet 
posts containing protest-related keywords, content deletion requests, and blocked 
websites. Surveillance is primarily measured through the frequency of government 
requests for user information, anecdotal evidence from activists, and information 
regarding cyber-spying. Activist participation will be gauged through protest turnout 
data, internet and mobile phone usage rates, and the number of downloads for “off the 
grid” mobile phone app FireChat. 
Since the PRC did not publically advertise the actions it took against anti-
government protestors, and freedom of speech in general, information from a series of 
sources will be compiled in the analysis section to shed light on specifically how the 
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government acted on the demonstrations. Information referencing the protests from 
Xinhua, the official state newspaper, and state-controlled China Central Television can be 
used to gauge the PRC’s public reaction to the events. Additionally, data collected from 
select blogs and social media platforms reveal that certain keywords related to the 
situation in Hong Kong were systematically censored.  
This research project will draw upon two theoretical approaches to discuss the 
results of the collected data: autocratic consolidation theory, and collective action theory. 
The data compiled in the case study will be approached through the illustrative strategy, 
which involves using an analytical tool for interpreting and clarifying a specific historical 
event. For this project, autocratic consolidation theory will provide an interpretative lens 
for the research question at hand. This theory was selected because it seeks to explain 
how authoritarian regimes become embedded in societies through social, institutional, or 
political factors. Additionally, a theory regarding collective action will be used in a 
supporting role in order to establish an understanding of mobilization and social 
movements. While the protestors are not the primary focus of this study, their motives, 
methods, and strategies, particularly as they pertain to ICTs, provide critical context for 
the analysis.   
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CHAPTER V 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
Since case studies provide a petri dish analysis of a real-life event, and these 
events do not take place in a vacuum, it is critical to provide context in order not to arrive 
at a one-sided, flawed, or overly simplistic conclusion.  This chapter will ground the role 
of ICTs within the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong with the goal of shedding 
light on the various factors that led to the PRC intervening in and ultimately containing 
the pro-democracy movement.  
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Protest is the most recent manifestation of the stark 
social, political, and cultural differences between the territory and Mainland China. Hong 
Kong’s divergent course began in 1842, when Great Britain acquired the peninsula as a 
colony in the aftermath of the First Opium War. The British negotiated a ninety-nine year 
lease with China, during which the colonial government sought to transform Hong Kong 
into a major trading hub. Although the original treaty called for a ninety-nine year lease 
of the territory, in reality Great Britain held on to Hong Kong for 150 years, which 
resulted in a century-and-a-half of divergent social, economic, and political development 
from the rest of China. As Hong Kong’s colonial occupation came to an end, the British 
and Chinese negotiated terms for the territory’s transfer, including the creation of a mini-
constitution called the Basic Law.  Hong Kong’s constitution outlines the territory’s 
governmental structure and the rights of its citizens, including the rights to free 
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expression and assembly.94 Of particular interest is the Basic Law’s stipulation that its 
“ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon 
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with 
democratic procedures.”95  
Since Hong Kong was transferred back to China in 1997, there have been dozens 
of protests criticizing the Mainland’s governance policies. Hong Kongers’ growing sense 
of dissatisfaction towards Beijing’s ability to manage the territory was solidified in a poll 
that revealed the highest levels of disapproval in a decade.96 Of Hong Kong residents 
between the ages of 21 and 29, 82 percent registered disapproval.97 The nature of the 
protests indicates a schism in the expectations that Hong Kong and China each have for 
the territory’s future. Hong Kong expects a progressively more liberal, Western-style 
democracy which upholds rule of law as well as freedom of speech, association, and 
universal suffrage. China expects to eventually assimilate Hong Kong into the 
Mainland’s authoritarian administration, while providing the territory with a marginal 
degree of social and political freedom beyond what the Mainland enjoys.  
Under the current One Country, Two Systems policy, Hong Kong is legally 
guaranteed certain liberties, such as freedom of speech and association.98 However, there 
appears to be a widening grey zone between law and practice where the liberties of 
residents of Hong Kong are not as clear cut as the constitutional language implies. 
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Particularly, human rights issues such as the violation of free speech and assembly, 
privacy rights, and covert surveillance are of concern. Although the legal rights outlined 
in Hong Kong’s current constitution are guaranteed until 2047, at which point the 
territory will be fully transferred over to the People’s Republic of China, some residents 
of Hong Kong feel their freedoms are already slipping away as Mainland China gains 
economic and political momentum.  
A prime example of this authoritarian encroachment occurred in 2003 when, 
under pressure from officials in Beijing, Hong Kong’s legislature attempted to quickly 
and quietly pass an anti-sedition law that would allow for the warrantless search of 
individuals or groups deemed subversive, a crime which could carry a life-time prison 
sentence. People in Hong Kong were particularly alarmed by the broad, ambiguous 
definition of “subversive” activity and the apparent disregard for due process. As a result, 
Hong Kong erupted into the largest protests in the territory’s history, with over half a 
million people taking to the streets. Due to the massive outcry, the law was ultimately 
shelved.99 A similar incident played out a decade later in 2012, when a Beijing-backed 
law to introduce a patriotic education program in Hong Kong schools once again drew 
the public’s ire. The government explained that the classes were necessary to cultivate a 
sense of shared national identity with China, but critics accused the program of being an 
overt attempt at indoctrinating Hong Kong’s youth with pro-communist ideals. After 
weeks of protests, the government finally compromised by making the classes 
optional.100 Considering Hong Kongers lack a formal democratic channel with the 
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Mainland, and that authoritarian China is not legally bound to appease popular demands, 
Hong Kong’s protests have been surprisingly effective in blocking Beijing’s creeping 
legal advancements.  
Sparks began to fly once more in early 2014 as China and Hong Kong’s 
administrations began hashing out details regarding election reforms for the territory. One 
of the reforms promised to Hong Kong was universal suffrage by 2017. In other words, 
residents of Hong Kong would be able to vote in open, free elections on who would 
become the territory’s next Executive leader. In order to show Hong Kong’s commitment 
to democracy, the civic group Occupy Central organized a nation-wide unofficial 
referendum regarding the future of Hong Kong’s elections. Representatives of the PRC 
immediately decried the referendum, stating in Xinhua, the official news outlet, that the 
referendum was both invalid and illegal.101 Another official remarked, “No plot by a so-
called ‘civil disobedience movement’ to force the central government to make 
concessions on principles and on its bottom line stands any chance of success.”102 
Beijing’s stance was clear. In addition to the official disapproval of the PRC, the 
referendum was also plagued by cyber-attacks which temporarily shut down voting. The 
election platform was struck by a sophisticated denial of service (DDOS) attack described 
as “one of the largest and most persistent” of its kind.103 The referendum organizers 
blamed hackers supported by the Chinese authorities, but the origin of the digital attack 
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was never officially determined. However, despite the setbacks, over half a million 
participants were able to cast symbolic ballots.104    
Amid rising tensions over Hong Kong election reforms, Beijing released a white 
paper reasserting its authority and comprehensive jurisdiction over the territory.105 
According to Chinese authorities, the statement was released in order to clarify the 
power-structure between Hong Kong and China, and to dispel any misunderstandings 
regarding the current One Country, Two Systems policy. The doctrine stated that "Hong 
Kong can maintain prosperity and stability for a long time only when the policy of 'one-
country, two systems' is fully understood and implemented," and additionally stressed the 
importance of patriotism toward the central government.106 Alan Leong, a Hong Long 
legislator and head of the pro-democratic Civic Party, explained that the statement was 
unprecedented because the PRC had never before asserted that Hong Kong’s legislative 
structure should prioritize the needs of the Mainland.107 The statement also appeared to 
be a turning point for Hong Kong’s pro-democracy advocates, with some being 
invigorated by what they perceived as an attack on Hong Kong’s liberties, while others 
became disheartened and doubtful of the territory’s future.  
The catalyst of the Umbrella Movement was the announcement on August 31, 
2014, that the PRC’s electoral reforms would come in the form of a popular election 
between candidates pre-chosen by officials in Beijing. In other words, the people of Hong 
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Kong could select its Chief Executive, but Beijing would choose the candidates. Pro-
democracy advocates ridiculed the plan, arguing that it made a mockery of universal 
suffrage and gutted the democratic principle of “one person, one vote.” A detailed 
breakdown of the ensuing events will be covered in the next section.  
 
Timeline of Events  
This project will address the reasons for which ICTs were used by the PRC in 
order to limit freedom of speech and collective action during the Umbrella Movement 
which began in Hong Kong in September 2014 and evolved into a seventy-nine day 
occupation of the city’s financial district. The burst of protests that occurred in late 
summer 2014 are over, but the struggle of pro-democratic activists to see their dream of 
universal suffrage realized is still technically ongoing. The conclusion chapter will 
provide a progress update on the issue of universal suffrage, as well as cover related 
events which have taken place since the 2014 Umbrella protests.  
On September 22, 2014, the first official protest of the Umbrella Movement began 
when members of the student group Scholarism staged a week long class boycott 
demanding that the PRC allow Hong Kong to hold open nominations for Chief Executive 
candidates. Tens of thousands of protestors joined the movement in the ensuing days, and 
on September 26, students stormed Hong Kong’s Civic Square, a public space abutting a 
number of government buildings. Police responded with tear gas and arrested dozens of 
demonstrators, including key student leaders. This marked a turning point in the 
movement because it was the first time police demonstrated force against the peaceful 
protestors. While the actions of the authorities aimed to slow down the movement, 
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activists were galvanized by what they perceived as an attack on their constitutional 
freedoms. The image of a demonstrator wielding an umbrella against a thick cloud of tear 
gas spread like wildfire across social media and became a symbol for the movement.  
Despite the movement’s growing inertia in the face of government pushback, 
activists were dealt a major blow when days later an organized gang disrupted the 
peaceful demonstrations. A violent mob of masked attackers tore through the 
demonstration, attacking activists and slashing tents and banners in an attempt to incite 
fear and chaos. After arresting 19 attackers, police confirmed that eight had ties to a local 
organized crime group known as the Triad. The attacks sparked paranoia amongst 
activists and resulted in accusations that the thugs were paid by the government to disrupt 
the demonstration.108 Hong Kong officials similarly accused the PRC of orchestrating 
terror to disperse protestors and condemned the use of physical force against peaceful 
activists. 109 The territory’s pro-Beijing secretary of state launched back that the 
accusations were fabricated and unfair, but encouraged the activists to disperse before 
further violence occurred.110 Ultimately the claims could neither be officially confirmed 
nor disproven, and the event became another fracture between the government and the 
populace, marked by suspicion and distrust. The final, major event of the Umbrella 
protest was the Peace Rally on October 4.111 Tens of thousands of demonstrators 
converged in Hong Kong’s government district in defiance of the recent attacks against 
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protestors, and in order to demonstrate their commitment to universal suffrage despite 
government pushback.  
 
Role of ICTs in the Umbrella Movement  
Based on evidence gathered about the protests, this project found that the PRC 
utilized ICTs to limit activist dialogue and collective action through censorship and 
surveillance. This section is broken into two sub-sections which explore specific methods 
the PRC utilized in order to maintain social control, and will also include some reference 
to how activists likewise utilized ICTs in attempts to achieve their own goals. This will 
ensure a balanced, full-picture analysis of the event.  
 
Censorship 
ICTs have formed the backbone of China’s censorship program since the internet 
was first adopted by the country in 1994.112 Over the years, the censorship program has 
become more sophisticated and has expanded to block dozens of websites and thousands 
of forbidden terms. Recent research suggests that the goal of such an initiative is not to 
simply halt digitally-based political dialogue, but to actively search for signs of collective 
action potential, clip social ties, and therefore disrupt or mitigate the impact of these 
budding movements.113 
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From the start of the Umbrella Movement, activists very openly and actively 
utilized ICTs as tools to plan, organize, and execute actions towards achieving collective 
goals. Social media platforms and texting apps were particularly popular. With services 
like Whatsapp and Firechat, individuals could mobilize their friends and acquaintances to 
join them at protest sites as easily as asking them out to dinner.114 Activists also 
harnessed digital technology as a launch pad for broad calls to action and appeals for 
international support. A video by student activist Glacier Kwong titled “Please Help 
Hong Kong,” was re-posted over a million times in the early days of the movement.115 
This type of widespread international attention is potent because it can bolster activists 
and encourage new participants to join.116  
Evidence from the Umbrella Movement shows that PRC censors were actively 
engaged in minimizing the digital impact of the movement. Censorship of search terms 
related to the protests, deletion of related blog posts and images, and blocking platforms 
like Instagram were all techniques the PRC utilized to disrupt communication both 
between protestors, and between activists and the outside world. In addition to using 
ICTs to stem collective action, PRC officials are also aware of the internet’s capacity to 
serve as an alternative press. Since the PRC relies on a single, state-driven narrative, 
sources of alternative, conflicting information can be highly problematic. As a result, the 
PRC relied on ICT-based censorship initiatives to diffuse collection action and curtail the 
spread of information related to the protests.  
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Programs like the Hong Kong Transparency Report have actively tracked 
censorship and other evidence of violations of free speech for years. Reports showed a 
major increase in censorship activity during 2014. Between September and December 
2014, the most active months of the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong police made 101 
demands for content deletion to various websites. In comparison, a total of 94 requests 
were made during the four previous years combined. Observers from Hong Kong’s 
academic community indicated that the way law enforcement demanded the removal of 
content revealed potential abuse of power and lack of transparency.117  
To internet users, the dramatic spike in censorship was apparent as blog entries 
containing key words related to the unrest in Hong Kong rapidly disappeared. The 
University of Hong Kong’s Weiboscope censorship-monitoring project reported a 
massive spike in deleted posts during the week the protests began. At its peak, over 150 
per 10,000 posts were being erased, with the term “Hong Kong” being the most widely 
deleted.118 Interestingly, the term “Hong Kong protests” was not censored, and in fact 
rapidly became one of the most popularly searched terms. However, search results 
yielded only a list of carefully curated pro-government results, indicating that dialogue-
steering was likely taking place.119 
Users of Sina Weibo, a social media platform similar to Twitter popular 
throughout China and Hong Kong, reported over 20 blocked terms including “Occupy 
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Central” (an alternative name for the Umbrella Movement), the names of key student 
leaders, protest sites such as the city’s Admiralty government district, and the names of 
participating student groups. Additionally, search terms containing “Hong Kong” 
followed by words like “student strike,” “tear gas,” “open fire,” and “disobey orders” 
were also blocked. Phrases implying support of the movement, including “Go Hong 
Kong” and “Today we are all Hong Kongers” were similarly banned.120The largest spike 
in censorship activity occurring on and just after September 28, the day that riot police 
took action against Hong Kong protestors and made several dozen arrests. On the same 
date, Instagram was blocked after activists began uploading pictures of clashes with 
police, with users receiving the error message “Cannot refresh stream.” The impetus of 
the censorship was clear: thanks to social media, Beijing realized it was under the world’s 
microscope.121 Situations like this reveal the inherent duality of ICTs: Web-based 
visibility meant that Beijing’s hands were tied in terms of blatant physical action it could 
take against demonstrators, but ICTs also allowed the government to rely more heavily 
on subtler methods of control like censorship and the surveillance of activists.  
 
Surveillance 
Surveillance is another technique of social control commonly utilized by the 
Chinese government. Unlike censorship, surveillance can be very difficult to detect and is 
often not initially apparent to the individuals being monitored. For these reasons, 
measurable data related to surveillance was difficult to find, and most evidence was 
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anecdotal. That being said, in the year since the Hong Kong Umbrella Protests took 
place, some evidence of the surveillance of activists, movement-sympathizers, and other 
pro-democracy individuals has emerged. Based on evidence and accounts from activists, 
Hong Kong police used a blend of ICT-based surveillance and more traditional methods 
like physically shadowing activists.122  
Phone tapping has a long history in Hong Kong, and reports of monitoring pro-
democracy advocates and Mainland defectors stretch back to the late 1990’s. Legislation 
introduced in 2006 was meant to regulate phone surveillance, but anecdotes from long-
time activists reveal that the practice has far from vanished.123 Among democracy 
supporters, reports of suspicious phone activity, including clicking, echoes, dropped calls, 
garbled voices, and muffled voices speaking Mandarin are common.124 A founding 
member of a leading pro-democracy organization in Hong Kong remarked, “My phone 
was tapped for the first time in 1989. For years, I’d hear strange clicking sounds in my 
calls. It’s started again in the recent years as I prepared for Occupy Central.”125 Dmitri 
Alperovitch, co-founder of an American cybersecurity company, closely monitored the 
situation in Hong Kong. “If you’re using a cellphone or landline in Hong Kong and 
you’re one of the protestors, you should absolutely expect that your phone calls are being 
listened to by the Chinese authorities. I would advise them to be paranoid.”126  
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Although there were numerous reports and allegations of phone tapping, the vast 
majority of evidence is anecdotal, and no concrete data exists to gage the frequency 
which it occurred. However, internet-based surveillance was slightly less elusive and 
more quantifiable than phone-based techniques. During the Umbrella movement, at least 
one Beijing-linked spy ring was discovered by international cyber-security companies. 
The spy ring, which was referred to as Deep Panda, was found to have covertly gained 
access to computer networks of both pro-democracy activists and an affiliated political 
party known for its pro-suffrage platform. Deep Panda’s cyber-spies were able to 
infiltrate users’ computers and smart phones through a malware virus. By hijacking 
someone’s contact list, Deep Panda could send out a fake message which appeared to be 
from a friend, but when the message was opened, a virus was installed on the device 
which could then collect emails, text messages, and eavesdrop on phone conversations. 
Spies could also download the contact list off the infected device, and the cycle would 
begin all over again as new spyware infected messages were sent out.127 Deep Panda, or a 
similar cyber spy-ring, is also thought to be responsible for publically leaking emails and 
files from several of Hong Kong’s high-profile democracy activists. 
In the year of the protests, police made 4,234 requests for the personal 
information of online users including email and IP addresses.128 Only a small number of 
these were issued under court order. While this may seem startling, Hong Kong’s legal 
framework has been shaped in such a way that residents are not adequately protected 
from online surveillance. Due to a legal loophole, police surveillance via phone, fax, or 
mail must be approved by a judge in the interest of public security or crime prevention, 
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but the law does not cover online surveillance. Additionally, the language of the law itself 
is quite vague. Jennifer Zhang, a researcher at University of Hong Kong, explains that 
“The only law that protects user privacy, the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, is very 
vague in this regard. It allows police to request user information from service providers 
for a very simple and general ‘criminal prevention’ purpose.”129 For the tech-savvy, 
surveillance was not necessarily an insurmountable threat. Umbrella activists, concerned 
about police snooping, utilized off-the-grid mobile phone apps like FireChat to 
communicate anonymously. FireChat was originally designed to be used at music 
festivals and allows mobile phone users to connect directly to one another without 
connecting to the internet. Since users were at no point connected to the internet, they left 
no digital fingerprint, and their user information could not be traced by authorities. 
Activists were able to plan, coordinate, share information, and encourage others to join 
without fear of reprisals. The app was immensely popular with protestors. Data reveals 
that it was downloaded over 500,000 times in the first two weeks of the protest, recorded 
over 1.6 million chatrooms, and 10.2 million chat sessions.130 In a region like Hong 
Kong, which boasts a cell phone usership rate of over 200 percent (roughly two phones 
per person), an anonymous chat app is an immensely powerful communication tool.131 
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CHAPTER VI 
 ANALYSIS 
 
 Communication technology played a central role in the struggle between Hong 
Kong activists and the Mainland government during the 2014 Umbrella Movement. 
Based on the evidence, this study found that the PRC was indeed using ICTs to limit the 
flow of information and minimize collective action potential related to Hong Kong’s pro-
democracy Umbrella movement. The gathered data centered on instances of censorship 
and surveillance that the PRC engaged in during the protest.  
The PRC’s usage of censorship during the protest is well-documented. Evidence 
of censorship included prohibited search terms, content deletion, and blocked websites. 
Reasons for this activity, according to the theoretical framework, are two-fold: In the 
interest of self-preservation, the PRC is driven to limit the transmission of politically 
sensitive information, in addition to taking a special interest in information that could 
catalyze into collective action. These methods were clear in the way the PRC sterilized 
blogs and websites during the time period of the protests. The deletion of protest-specific 
content and keywords reveals that the PRC took an active role in attempting to minimize 
the digital impact of the event. By focusing their censorship efforts on certain strategic 
keywords, such as the names of well-known movement leaders and particular 
demonstrations, the PRC was attempting to make it difficult for would-be participants to 
mobilize at particular protest sites. These actions are supported by the theoretical 
 57 
 
framework’s expectation that China, while attempting to censor all politically sensitive 
content, would focus on content that could mobilize collective action.132 The sheer rise in 
censorship frequency is also indicative. Although the PRC routinely engages in web 
censorship, the time period of the protests experienced a massive spike in content 
deletion, indicating the Umbrella movement was a high priority for the PRC. In this case, 
PRC censors launched a broad drag-net for politically sensitive content related to Hong 
Kong’s struggle for democracy, but specifically focused on protest-specific keywords.  
 Surveillance was also employed by the PRC during the protests, but evidence 
tended to be more anecdotal in nature with the exception of the frequency of police 
requests for user information and the discovery of the Deep Panda cyber-spy network. 
The scarcity of concrete evidence is not altogether surprising since surveillance falls 
squarely into the second generation of social control, meaning techniques used to monitor 
civilian activity are more subtle than direct censorship. The PRC, aware of the negative 
impact that illegally monitoring citizens would have on their legitimacy, knows that 
subtlety is key for regime preservation. As stated in the literature about authoritarian 
consolidation, even autocratic regimes have to rely on a carefully maintained sense of 
legitimacy in order to remain in power. The usage of surveillance ties into the need for 
subtle methods of social control as highlighted in authoritarian consolidation theory. 
While certain instances of surveillance are documented, overall data is limited, so it is 
admittedly difficult to discern the exact level of the PRC’s direct involvement from 
paranoia amongst activists. 
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In summary, the evidence gathered from the Umbrella Movement supports major 
components of both the theories of authoritarian consolidation and collective action 
potential. Authoritarian consolidation theory explains that regimes survive through subtle 
social coercion. This is supported by evidence of the censorship of protest-related key 
words, the promotion of patriotic content, and the surveillance and intimidation of 
activists. Together, these techniques work to steer the public perception of the events 
while simultaneously minimizing their digital impact. As theory predicted, the PRC used 
ICTs to employ subtle mechanism of social control with the goal of maintaining the 
delicate balance between power consolidation and perceptions of legitimacy.  
The PRC’s approach to coercive tactics against unrest in the Mainland is well-
illustrated by a case in 2009 when the Chinese government instituted an internet ban to 
the province of Xinjiang after a period of rioting, leaving seven million users without 
access to the Net for ten months. The government justified the ban by explaining that the 
riots were organized using the internet and mobile phones.133  Xinjiang’s full internet ban 
is an extreme example of how elites partner to control access, but subtler, more complex 
systems are at work on a daily basis throughout China. Major internet service providers 
and social media platforms are complicit with government censorship programs. An 
editor of a popular Chinese micro-blogging website Sina.com published a blog post 
detailing the company’s elaborate censorship scheme.134 A number of other popular 
social media websites share similar programs, and according to anonymous testimonies 
from their employees, are under “direct pressure from Chinese internet authorities to 
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bolster their systems for monitoring content.”135 While the PRC did not go as far as a full 
internet shutdown in Hong Kong, activists were fearful enough of the prospect that 
thousands flocked to off-grid apps like FireChat which would allow them to maintain 
communication in the event of a shutdown.136 Additionally, the Xinjiang case illustrates 
that the PRC was comfortable employing openly repressive tactics on the Mainland but 
not in Hong Kong.  
In addition to substantiating the impact of coercion on regime legitimacy, the 
social upheaval of the Umbrella protests also sheds light on the PRC’s progress towards 
regime resilience, another key factor in long-term regime survival. Prior research 
indicates that in the absence of formal democratic institutions, authoritarian governments 
often establish alternative channels of participation to address citizen concerns or at least 
create the illusion of doing so.137 According to authoritarian consolidation theory, 
regimes lacking both formal and informal institutions through which the populace can 
vent their opinions, complaints, and concerns, will rapidly lose legitimacy.138  
In Mainland China, local government agencies were created to “absorb and 
process demands, expand the consultative capacities of their systems, give a stake in the 
system to various sections of their populations, and perhaps preempt demands for more 
far-reaching and anti-systemic change.”1 For example, many Chinese localities also 
employ e-governance platforms, where citizens can file concerns online. However, these 
concerns often go unaddressed by the local authorities, and instead offer a thin veneer of 
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political participation. E-governance platforms cannot address large or systemic issues, 
but can target small problems like petty corruption or damaged urban infrastructure, the 
results of which, if addressed, are tangibly visible to the populace and strengthen the 
perception that the government is indeed responsive to citizen demands.139 ICTs have 
become such a popular platform that the PRC actually encourages departments and 
officials to set up micro-blogs in a further effort to expand online presence and steer 
digital political discourse. Between January 2011 and December 2012, the number of 
official blogs swelled from less than 1,000 to 130,000.140  
While the PRC has established a number of these alternative channels in the 
Mainland, including e-governance platforms and official blogs, they remain 
underdeveloped in Hong Kong. Politically, the territory has been caught in awkward 
limbo between the goal of Western-style free elections and the slowly encroaching 
communist institutions of the Mainland since its transfer back to China in 1997. The 
absence of direct communication between Hong Kongers and the Mainland government, 
through either formal or informal channels, likely contributes to the collective frustration 
that catalyzed the Umbrella Movement and similar pro-democratic protests. As long as 
Hong Kong remains in limbo, the PRC’s legitimacy will be seriously compromised, and 
the resulting likelihood of collective action high.  
The second theory used in this research project, collective action theory, 
establishes a lens through which to examine how authoritarian governments identify and 
react to signs of budding collectivization. Recent findings on censorship conclude that 
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posts by Chinese netizens criticizing the government are no more likely to be censored 
than non-political posts. Instead, censorship is used strategically to clip social ties when 
signs of collective action are evident.141 The PRC’s ability to predict, prevent, and defuse 
collective action through calibrated coercion are key to the regime’s success and stability. 
The government’s sensitivity makes sense given China’s historical tradition of political 
legitimacy gained through collective action.142 Any hint of social unrest is treated as a 
potential threat to the country’s political stability. As a result, China has built the world’s 
most complex, labyrinthine system of information filters, which is made possible by 
ICTs.   
For activists, ICTs came into play as an unsanctioned avenue for political 
dialogue. Citizens of both Mainland China and Hong Kong are quick to turn to digital 
mediums as platforms to express their political views. Microblogs and social media sites 
have been used to voice complaints, express criticism and political opinions, and expose 
corruption. During the Umbrella Movement, activists turned to informal channels of 
participation like microblogs, social media platforms, and off-the-grid messaging 
applications to disseminate information and coordinate demonstrations. The looming 
threat of networked collective action has spurred the PRC to adapt its governance 
strategy to a more deliberative approach in order to maintain legitimacy.  
Fear of repercussions for publically expressing political opinions are not limited 
to private citizens. A study conducted in 2008 discovered that 30 percent of Hong Kong 
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journalists admitted to having self-censored their work, and another 58 percent of 
respondents reported that self-censorship has increased since China absorbed Hong Kong 
1997. These numbers reveal a clear concern amongst journalists about publically 
attaching their names to content that could be considered controversial or politically 
dangerous. As stated previously, many Umbrella Protestors turned to off-grid mobile 
phone applications which allowed activists to connect anonymously to one another in 
order to evade both censorship and surveillance. Anonymity is one of the major 
advantages that ICTs provide to activists.  
 Government actions to maintain social order, especially those occurring in a legal 
or moral gray zone, are often purposefully done in a cloak-and-dagger fashion that makes 
them difficult to prove. This can create an atmosphere of paranoia, with some instances 
being justifiable while other instances are purely imagined.  While there is enough 
concrete evidence to suggest that the PRC actively engaged in censorship and some 
instances of illegal surveillance, the impact of these actions could have possibly been 
exaggerated by the prevailing atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia among activists. A 
possible alternative explanation for the results, and a possible avenue of future research 
on the topic, would be the role that self-censorship and paranoia plays among activists in 
authoritarian countries.  
The PRC’s methods for mitigating collective action in Hong Kong are clear, but 
of equal importance are the PRC’s reasons for doing so, especially in light of the fact that 
Hong Kong’s constitution both guarantees freedom of expression and universal suffrage. 
Circling back to the research question at hand, why did China attempt to undermine Hong 
Kong activists’ legal right to free expression in order to prevent the democratic elections 
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promised in Hong Kong’s constitution? In summary, the PRC’s leadership fears that 
universal suffrage in Hong Kong will disrupt China’s delicate process of authoritarian 
consolidation. While political leaders in China are typically secretive about the inner-
workings of the Communist Party’s strategic objectives, evidence suggests that Hong 
Kong’s democratic transition could threaten the party’s grip on power in several key 
ways.  
First is the PRC’s level of legitimacy. Regimes both democratic and authoritarian 
are built on a foundation of legitimacy that, if eroded, compromised, or destroyed, 
typically sound the death knell of the regime in question. A damaged sense of legitimacy 
can leave regimes vulnerable to internal agitation and demands for regime change. From 
the perspective of PRC leadership, a most troubling consequence of a democratic Hong 
Kong can be referred to as “democratic contagion.”143 PRC leaders undoubtedly watched 
the Arab Spring unfold as, one by one, long-standing authoritarian regimes succumbed to 
unrest and political upheaval which spread across the region like sparks to dry grass. 
Similarly, the same PRC leaders observed how shortly after Hong Kong erupted into 
protests, social media posts in solidarity with the activists began appearing on Mainland-
based blogs.144 Users uploaded posts like “Dictators will always be eliminated, and 
democracy can’t be stopped,” and “Support Hong Kong! If you [the protesters] hang 
back, our situation today will be your situation tomorrow!!!”145 A few activists in 
Shanghai even uploaded pictures of themselves with signs bearing pro-democracy 
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messages.146 While any protest-related posts were quickly deleted, it is clear that ICTs 
enabled the rapid transmission of ideas and provided an opportunity for solidarity and 
sympathy between users. What the censors, and by association the PRC leadership, fears 
is that ICTs can act as a vector for democratic contagion, or the idea that a pro-
democracy movement could spread into China via social media and erupt into a full-blow 
political movement which could prove disastrous to the regime.147  
Second, a democratic Hong Kong could impact China’s foreign relations in ways 
that are unfavorable to the PRC. Leaders of China’s Communist Party have long 
suspected Western powers of fueling unrest in Hong Kong. In February 2014, just 
months after the Umbrella Movement, a high-ranking communist party official stated 
that, “International political forces and anti-CCP148 international organizations are deeply 
involved, at the political, organizational, societal, and community levels, in transforming 
Hong Kong into an anti-CCP and anti-China region and making Hong Kong a battlefield 
of international political power.”149 Similarly, the former director of China’s pro-
communist publication Xinhua accused foreign and local powers of conspiring to seize 
power in Hong Kong.150 If democratic elections were to come about in Hong Kong, the 
PRC fears that Western-backed candidates would rise to power and essentially allow 
foreign powers a back door into China’s political sphere.    
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In addition to effecting US-China relations, democracy in Hong Kong could 
potentially shift China’s dynamic with Taiwan.151 While Hong Kong is China’s crown 
jewel in terms of trade and development, the territory’s acquisition was still only one 
facet of the PRC’s long-term plan for consolidation and expansion. Since Taiwan broke 
away from the Mainland following Mao’s ascent in 1949, the PRC has made it a priority 
to win the island back. The PRC’s main point of negotiating Taiwan’s return is the 
success of the “One Country, Two Systems” model of Hong Kong and Macau.152 Hong 
Kong’s departure from the model would signal the model’s failure, which could 
potentially nix the PRC’s key negotiating tactic with Taiwan. Chinese leaders have 
repeatedly stressed the importance of winning back Taiwan, so any back-pedaling would 
be a major blow to the PRC’s reunification plan. 
For the reasons stated above, the PRC intervened in ways that quarantined the 
Umbrella Movement, including halting the spread of information online, undermining 
activists’ ability to collectivize, and using surveillance to track and intimidate activists. 
While the prospect of an angry group of cell phone-wielding students facing down the 
full force of the PRC seems doomed to failure, evidence from the protests suggests that 
activists may yet have reason to remain optimistic. Ironically, by refusing to compromise 
with activists as they have done in the past, the PRC may have actually fanned the flames 
of the movement so that the conflict grew substantially before finally losing momentum 
in the winter of 2014. As the PRC cracked down, more activists were galvanized to join 
the cause, and the international community began to pay attention to the Umbrella 
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Movement despite smaller, but ultimately more effective, protests having slipped by in 
the past. While the initial vigor and energy of the movement died down in 2014, key 
leaders have vowed to continue their struggle for universal suffrage. The following 
chapter will provide updates regarding what has happened since the main protests ended 
in the winter of 2014. Given this information, perhaps the question of why Hong Kong 
activists failed may be re-framed as why Hong Kong activists have not yet succeeded.  
 In short, in a world where authoritarian governance unexpectedly survived into 
the twenty-first century, it is important for researchers to fully explore the tactics these 
regimes use to perpetuate their rule and the reasoning behind these decisions. ICTs have 
also radically changed the landscape of civilian participation in social and political 
dialogues. In the past decade, the world has seen cases of protestors harnessing ICTs to 
triumph over dictatorships, and other cases where activists wielded the same technology 
without achieving their collective goals. Case study research can reveal why certain 
movements succeeded while others did not by taking into account the unique context in 
which the events took place. The results of these studies can help scholars and 
policymakers more fully understand the unique obstacles that activists must overcome in 
order achieve common goals. The project’s findings further illuminate the sophisticated 
mechanisms of ICT-rooted social control that the PRC employs against activists, in 
addition to providing a more nuanced understanding of the PRC’s motivations for 
intervention, for the benefit of future scholars, policymakers, and activists.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
This project investigated how the PRC utilized ICTs to diffuse collective action 
and halt the flow of protest-related information during Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella 
Movement. Through a combination of primary sources from social media outlets and 
interviews, and secondary sources such as news articles and academic research, this 
thesis has established a contextual analysis of what role ICTs played in maintaining 
social order during the protests.  
In Chapter Three, this project proposed a synthesis of two theories: Authoritarian 
consolidation theory and collective action theory. Through this theoretical framework, 
this paper argued that the government would be able to effectively prevent protestors 
from meeting their goals by diffusing collective action potential and by limiting ICTs as 
an unsanctioned avenue for political dialogue. Evidence gathered during the protests and 
the fact that activists did not meet their goal of universal suffrage support the project’s 
hypothesis. That being said, it is important to note the ongoing nature of Hong Kong’s 
unrest. While the future of the territory’s bid for universal suffrage appears to be far from 
over, this paper focused specifically on the three month period between September and 
December 2014, which marked the height of the protests, and found that during that time 
the PRC was able to prevent pro-democratic activists from meeting their objective of 
universal suffrage.  
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Over a year has passed since the Umbrella protests exploded at the heart of Hong  
Kong’s government district. This section will provide pertinent updates on the 
movement, which has lost much of its momentum but is still ultimately ongoing among a 
small group of devoted activists. A major victory for pro-democracy activists occurred in 
June 2015 when Hong Kong’s legislature vetoed Beijing’s controversial electoral reform 
proposal. The reforms, which generated the initial spark of the Umbrella movement, 
would have allowed Hong Kong residents to vote for their executive leaders, but 
candidates would come from a list pre-selected by officials in Beijing. Of the 37 
members of the legislative council who voted, 28 rejected the reforms. While this is 
certainly a huge accomplishment for advocates of universal suffrage, the veto does not 
guarantee that a more progressive plan will be introduced. The reactions of certain key 
leaders to the veto are also not altogether promising for the pro-democracy base. Leung 
Chun-ying, Hong Kong’s current leader and a vocal advocate of Beijing, framed the veto 
as a major loss: “Today 28 legco153 members voted against the wishes of the majority of 
Hong Kong people, and denied them the democratic right to elect the chief executive in 
the next election.”154 While the tone of Leung’s comment was one of disappointment, the 
PRC’s official statement ridiculed the decision, remarking that it, “…fully exposes their 
selfish interests, hinders Hong Kong’s democratic development and damages the essence 
of Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.”155 Since making the statement, China has not 
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altered its stance or given any indication that it is willing to further negotiate its position 
on future elections.  
Pro-democracy advocates, galvanized by the defeat of the reform package, once 
again flooded the streets of Hong Kong in July 2015. Activists demanded the resignation 
of Leung Chun-ying, Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing executive leader. With just over 48,000 
protestors, the march was one of the smallest of the Umbrella movement, but activists did 
not necessarily interpret the low turn-out as a sign of concern. Johnson Yeung, an 
organizer with Hong Kong’s Civil Human Rights Watch explained that, “Hong Kong 
people have been through a lot and they’ve mobilized massively over the past few years. 
So after the veto, it’s quite natural for them to want to take a rest.”156 After the victory of 
early summer, August 2015 dealt a sobering blow to the movement when key protest 
leaders were charged with the crimes of unlawful assembly and inciting the participation 
of others.157 If the student leaders are convicted, they could spend up to five years in 
prison. Despite their uncertain futures, the students expressed no regrets for their actions 
and reiterated their unwavering commitment to bringing the right to vote to Hong 
Kong.158 
 From a legal standpoint, the Umbrella movement has still not succeeded. Since 
Beijing first stated its plan to pre-approve all candidates for Hong Kong’s future leaders, 
it has not wavered on its decision, rescinded its position, or offered any opportunity for 
negotiation with Hong Kong’s pro-democratic groups. The reasons for the movement’s 
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failure to achieve its objective are numerous and complex, but on a macro-level, are due 
to China’s goal to further consolidate its authoritarian rule. To allow a territory, 
especially one as lucrative and financially coveted as Hong Kong, to branch off down a 
path to democracy would only serve to chip away at China’s absolute control. On a 
micro-level, China’s finely tuned program of censorship and surveillance was able to 
minimize the impact of the movement despite the fact that activists had wide access to 
ICTs.  
Research of post-communist societies in Eastern Europe reveal that access to the 
internet – even a relatively liberal internet – does not guarantee the success of social or 
political movements against authoritarian regimes.159 Ultimately, the success of a 
movement is tied to a complexity of factors including the resilience of the regime, the 
strength of opposition forces, and structural, institutional, or societal barriers. Essentially, 
ICTs are an asset for activists, but successful movements can only take place if the 
conditions are right.160 In the case of Hong Kong, it is very likely that ICTs aided 
activists in organization, mobilization, and the communication of their message to a 
broader audience, but were unable to overcome the structural and institutional barriers 
unique to Chinese authoritarian rule.   
Since the term “Twitter revolution” and “Facebook revolution” were coined in 
2009, a number of social movements and political upheavals around the globe have been 
labeled as products of social media and other forms of communication technologies. 
While some support this viewpoint of ICTs as liberators of the oppressed, others point 
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out that ICTs are susceptible to government manipulation in order to maintain social 
control and stem collective action.  
A future opportunity for research involves investigating the concept of “upgraded 
authoritarianism” in the context of China and Hong Kong. In essence, upgraded 
authoritarianism captures the process of how authoritarian regimes adapt and evolve in 
the face of pressure to democratize, rather than resist or capitulate.161 The results of this 
evolutionary process are “hybrid regimes” which have learned how to balance old 
mechanisms of authoritarian control with characteristics traditionally associated with 
democratic regimes, such as economic openness, pseudo-democratic institutions, and the 
appearance of a relatively unrestricted civil society.162 To be certain, these regimes are 
not actually democracies. Coercive tactics such as intimidation, harassment, and arrests 
are still employed, and the actions of citizens are carefully policed.  
However, upgraded authoritarian regimes are continuously perfecting subtler 
methods of social control in order to maintain a façade of progress away from the 
blatantly repressive tactics historically employed by autocratic regimes. While prior 
research on upgraded authoritarianism focuses on the Middle East, a case study on China 
would provide insight into how governments in other regions of the world adapt to 
democratic pressure. Additionally, a deeper understanding of China’s tactics would allow 
activists, scholars, and policy makers ideas on how to potentially counter the process and 
even gain traction for true democratic change.   
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This research topic bears prescience as the advancement of technology accelerates 
and access to ICTs increasingly saturates population centers. Since authoritarian regimes 
hinge on tight control of information and communication, it goes without saying that 
ICTs and their ability to fundamentally alter the flow of information will impact the 
dynamic between the government and the populace. Hong Kong makes for an interesting 
case since the country's tradition of laissez-faire attitudes towards free trade and 
expression have essentially primed the populace for democratic discourse. The ongoing 
political struggle between the people of Hong Kong and the Chinese government appears 
to be long from over, with student leaders who participated in the Umbrella Movement 
vowing to make a comeback. Heading into the future, it is likely that technology will play 
a significant if unpredictable role by potentially lending a voice to the populace's 
concerns, or by being shaped into another mechanism of authoritarian control. 
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